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BOOK REVIEW
Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality, by Torben
Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
224 pp. ISBN-13: 9780300153101 (hbk.). US$35.00.
I approached this book with some doubts because a book that promises ‘‘to
integrate the micro-level of families with the macro-level of national
institutions’’ seemed too ambitious not to be superficial and generic. I was
wrong. From the very first chapter, I was taken by the powerful and
empirically grounded arguments on which the authors rest their analysis.
The authors examine why women in the developed world still lag behind
men in the exercise of power in several fields.1 Following an introductory
chapter that sets out a political economy approach to studying gender
inequality, the book covers five topics in five main chapters: patriarchy,
gender division of labor, fertility, political preferences, and political
careers.
Iversen and Rosenbluth explore the complex relationships between
decision-making processes at a household level, the gender division of paid
and unpaid work, political power, fertility, economic modes of production,
and economic development. In other words, they provide some insight into
the different causal relationships between what happens at the micro level
of the household and at the macro level of the economy.
The authors begin their analysis by explaining the origins of patriarchy in
the productive structure of an economy. They argue that in hunter–
gatherer societies, women were more powerful; in agricultural economies,
the rigid division of gender roles within patriarchal systems became
functional to production. Women regained power in the process of
industrialization and have especially advanced in postindustrial societies in
which the service sector is predominant. These are not new ideas, but
Iversen and Rosenbluth explain these changes as a shift in the relative
bargaining power among partners, resulting from the rise in women’s
outside options (the ability to walk away from a marriage) and entry into
the labor market. Agricultural societies place a premium on men’s brawn,
Feminist Economics 2012, pp. 1–5, iFirst article
Feminist Economics ISSN 1354-5701 print/ISSN 1466-4372 online  2012 IAFFE
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2012.717176
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 de
gli
 St
ud
i d
i T
or
ino
], 
[M
ari
a L
au
ra 
Di
 T
om
ma
so
] a
t 0
3:4
9 1
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
2 
and therefore women’s employment is inefficient compared with men’s
employment. Industrialization and even more the rise of the service sector
have transformed social values, providing viable alternatives to unsatisfying
marriages.
Moreover, mate preferences vary accordingly in relation to the
productive structure of the economy. Indeed, simulations of the effect of
industrial and service employment on variables representing mate
preferences (the importance attached to chastity, being a good cook and
housekeeper, and having desire for home and children) show that these
values are less important in industrial and postindustrial societies.2 The
authors also link these phenomena to some features of the labor market,
particularly the skills required. When the skills required on the labor
market are mainly job specific, women’s labor force participation is low
because women have more career breaks and interruptions in their work
lives and therefore they are unable to invest too much in job-specific skills.
The more generic jobs and transferable skills are required in the labor
market, the higher is women’s labor force participation.
Iversen and Rosenbluth follow this with a discussion of the gender
division of labor, which they also explain through the bargaining process
within the household and the structure of the labor market. In a society
with high divorce rates, it would be efficient for women to invest in the
labor market and claim an equal division of work at home. So if outside
options are equally attractive to both sides, the authors would predict an
even distribution of household work. Nevertheless, both the rate of divorce
and the structure of the labor market influence the outcomes in terms of
division of labor: the higher the divorce rate, the higher the labor force
participation, and vice versa. Nevertheless, women’s participation in the
labor market tends to be lower in economies with specific-skills labor
markets; moreover, the distribution of household work tends to be more
unequal in systems with generic-skills labor markets. For instance, Iversen
and Rosenbluth argue that in the United States, a flexible labor market
favors women’s labor force participation and therefore a more equal
division of housework. The rigid, dualistic, and unionized labor market in
Italy prevents women from participating in the labor market and
discourages an equal division of housework. Governments, though, can
influence these outcomes: despite a quite rigid labor market, Scandinavian
countries, for instance, have a very high participation rate because of a
large and feminized public sector.
Another interesting idea of the book comes in Chapter 4, which discusses
fertility. Here the authors start with the much-studied link between fertility
and women’s labor market participation. In order to increase both
participation and fertility, they advocate not more publicly provided
child- and eldercare, but subsidies for highly flexible jobs and career
interruptions. They argue for these policies because in those countries with
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a labor market unfriendly to women and a low divorce rate (such as, Italy,
Greece, and Japan), women fight to enter into the labor market, and they
do not have children. They claim that a demonstration effect occurs:
women in societies with traditional gender roles imitate women in other
societies and enter the labor market, but they give up having children. In
their empirical analysis, Iversen and Rosenbluth find that fertility is
associated with general-skills occupations and part-time jobs. Fertility is also
associated with public spending and employment in the public sector. So,
for instance, the US and Sweden have high fertility rates because the US has
a labor market based on the availability of generic-skills jobs, and Sweden
has more specific-skills jobs but a large public sector. Germany and Japan
instead have low fertility rates because it is more difficult for women to find
employment in a rigid labor market.
Finally, in the last part of the book, Iversen and Rosenbluth concentrate
on two political issues: why women seem more likely to vote for left-wing
parties than men, and why women are underrepresented in politics. Using
data from twenty-three advanced democracies, Iversen and Rosenbluth
conclude, ‘‘The possibility of a gender gap in political preferences emerges
when marriage contracting is incomplete and termination of the contract is
an ever-present possibility. In this case, spouses will have conflicting
preferences over who receives family benefits, and they will differ over any
policies that affect their outside options’’ (p. 110). This conflict is not
because women will take the outside options, but because such options
increase their bargaining power in the household.
Iversen and Rosenbluth also examine the older political gender gap
wherein women are more conservative than men. The old gender gap is
common in countries where women have limited economic opportunities
and thus, fewer outside options and therefore a strong interest in
maintaining the sanctity and strength of traditional family values. By
contrast, the new gender gap is found in countries with women’s high
participation in the labor force because left parties are more likely to
support policies in favor of public child- and eldercare. Women therefore
are more likely to vote for left-wing parties because they can better invest in
their marketable skills if they have fewer care and domestic burdens.
Moving on to women’s participation in politics, Iversen and Rosenbluth
link women’s representation here to the specific characteristics required of
politicians. The authors argue that women’s political careers are easier in
those countries where being a politician is a flexible, temporary job than in
those countries where a political career means no breaks and full-time
work. Majoritarian electoral systems are less favorable to women than
proportional systems because in the former, candidates have to develop a
long-term tie to their constituents and to other politicians. Men can more
readily commit to long and continuous careers, and therefore they are
more likely to be elected and reelected. Proportional systems are more
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favorable to women. In their empirical analysis, the authors also find that
the representation of women in democratic legislatures is positively
influenced by the presence of programmatic parties (as opposed to
‘‘candidate-oriented parties’’ [p. 147]).
What I really find interesting in this book is not only the link between the
micro and macro levels of analysis, but also the interdisciplinary approach.
The analysis incorporates demographic, economic, political, and
sociological perspectives. The authors dare to be ambitious, and they
succeed because they do not limit themselves to a restricted field of analysis.
This book would be very good reading for international scholars in
economics, demography, political science, and sociology. It could also be
useful for teaching in general courses on gender studies and specifically for
courses in economics of gender, economics of the family, labor economics,
or political economy, at the undergraduate or graduate levels.
Here, I come to the only criticisms of this excellent book. Despite the
relevance of the research questions for a wide range of countries, the
reader quickly realizes that the authors have mainly industrialized countries
in mind. And the authors do not provide any explanations or justifications
for this choice.
Moreover, I also found myself uneasy in reading about gender inequality
and how to change it without questioning the male chauvinist structure of
work organization. In fact, the authors support policies to change the labor
market (a combination of generating more generic-skills jobs, more
flexibility, more public sector, and more service sector) in order to increase
women’s labor force participation and bargaining power at home and
equalize the sharing of housework. But they do not discuss work
organization, long paid working hours, the emphasis on attachment to
the company, and so on.
Moreover, the causal chain could be reversed: why not start from
reforming the division of labor at home, for instance, by introducing
compulsory paternity leaves and campaigns for men’s involvement in
housework? These changes could lead to men’s lower participation in the
labor market and decrease their relative bargaining power in the
household. What about a new book: Men, Work, and Politics?
Lastly, the book assigns a very important role to bargaining models of
household decisions, but it takes the theory about bargaining power
structure as a given and does not consider the relevant criticism of Amartya
Sen (1990) in a feminist perspective. Sen emphasizes that what matters in
terms of bargaining power are perceived contributions and perceived
interests. In particular, Sen argues that if one person were to attach less
value to his or her own well-being, then the solution to the household
bargaining process would be less favorable to that person, in terms of well-
being. Also, if in the accounting of the respective outcomes a person were
perceived as making a larger contribution, then the solution would be more
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favorable to that person. In other words, what matters is not only the ‘‘real’’
contribution, but also how that contribution is perceived. Sen’s criticism of
bargaining theories weakens the authors’ suggested causal links between
macro- and micro-level variables because these links are justified on the
basis of traditional bargaining theories that do not take into account
perceived contributions and perceived interests.
Maria Laura Di Tommaso
Department of Economics, University of Torino
Via Po 53, Turin 10100, Italy
NOTES
1 Each chapter includes a different selection of industrialized countries: for instance,
Chapter 5 analyzes Australia, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the US. Chapter 4 analyzes Austria, Belgium, the UK, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the US.
2 Simulations based on a sample of seventeen OECD countries from 1870 to 1995. David
M. Buss (1989) first carried out this analysis on a different sample of countries.
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